Carl von Clausewitz - On strategy in general

Chapter 1: Strategy

• strategic theory deals with planning
• a true mark of wisdom is to do just enough to accomplish an objective without trying to do more than current strength and resources allow

Chapter 2: Elements of strategy

• moral elements = everything that is created by intellectual and psychological qualities and influences
• physical elements = the size of the armed forces, their composition, armament and so forth
• mathematical elements = the angle of lines of operation, the convergent and divergent movements wherever geometry enters into their calculation
• geographical elements = the influence of terrain, such as commanding positions, mountains, rivers, woods, and roads
• statistical elements = support and maintenance.

Chapter 3: Moral factors

• moral factors are inseparable from war
• wisdom is cultivated not so much by critical studies, but by insight and flashes of intuition

Chapter 4: The principal moral elements

• they are: the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit

Chapter 5: Military virtues of the army

• military virtues are different than simple bravery
• military virtues are found only in regular armies
• military spirit is a critical element of war, and it is built by victorious wars and frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength
• don't confuse the real spirit of an army with its mood

Chapter 11: Concentration of forces in space

• being strong and keeping one's forces concentrated are the decisive factors in strategy
• concentration of force is the norm, and every separation and split is an exception that has to be justified

Chapter 13: The strategic reserve

• the 2 purposes of a reserve are to prolong and renew the action and to counter unforeseen threats

Chapter 14: Economy of force

• always ensure that all forces are involved, that no part of the whole force is idle
• wasting forces is worse than using them improperly
• completely inactive troops are neutralized, while even the smallest action can detract from the enemy's strength and focus

Chapter 16: The suspension of action in war

• both sides can't take same actions simultaneously. If one advances, the other is waiting
• politically, only one can be the aggressor: there can be no war if both parties seek to defend themselves.
• violent clashes are interrupted by periods of observation, during which both sides are on the defensive

Source(s):

On War

Carl von Clausewitz - On the theory of war

This post continues with a summary of the second book in Clausewitz's treatise, that deals with the theory of war:

Chapter 1: Classifications of the art of war

• the art of war is the art of using the given means in combat
• the distinction between tactics (the use of armed forces in the engagement) and strategy (the use of engagements for the object of the war)
• classification between combat activities (marches, camps and billets) and maintenance activities (supply, medical services and maintenance of arms and equipment)
• war activities classified in preparations for war and the actual war

Chapter 2: On the theory of war

• the use of intellect in warfare
• the need to create a system of theoretical principles for the conduct of war
• the role of theory is to guide someone who wants to learn about war, not to formulate the actions on the battlefield
• theory studies the nature of ends (victory) and means (the fighting forces)

Chapter 3: Art of war or science of war

• war is neither an art nor a science, but a clash of interests in the humans' social existence

Chapter 4: Method and routine

• a method or ‘mode of procedure’, is a constantly recurring procedure that has been selected from several possibilities.
• routines represent a general way of executing tasks as they arise based on average probability.
• constant practice leads to brisk, precise, and reliable leadership
• routine is better suited for tactics than for strategy
• a certain amount of subjectivity that reflects the personality of the commander exists in his actions. That style may not suit those who copy it

Chapter 5: Critical analysis

• critical analysis = the application of theoretical truths to actual events
• 3 steps in critical approach: 1) the discovery and interpretation of equivocal facts (historical research); 2) tracing effects back to their causes (critical analysis proper); 3) investigating and evaluating the means employed (criticism)
• A critical inquiry––the examination of the means––poses the question as to what are the peculiar effects of the means employed, and whether these effects conform to the intention with which they were used.
• a critic should analyze the reasons why an exception occurred

Chapter 6: On historical examples

• historical examples provide the best proof in empirical sciences. They can be used as an explanation of an idea to show the application of an idea, to prove the possibility of a phenomenon or effect, or to deduce a doctrine

Source(s):

On War

Carl von Clausewitz - On the nature of war

Prussia has produced notable personalities that influenced history, such as chancellor Bismarck and general Clausewitz. This is the first post in a series that focuses on Carl von Clausewitz's military theory treatise, On War. Here I summarize the contents of the first book, that discusses the nature of war.

Chapter 1: What is war?

• the definition of war
• acknowledges the need for the maximum use of force
• it is through their interaction that warring sides push each other to extremes
• the aim is to overcome or disarm the enemy (making him defenseless)
• was is not an isolated act and it doesn't consist of a single decisive blow
• the result of war is not final
• the similarity between war and a gamble
• war as a means of reaching a political goal

Chapter 2: Purpose and means in war

• the 3 objectives that must be considered: the armed forces, the country, and the enemy's will
• war doesn't involve the notion that the 2 states have relatively equal strength
• methods to increase the cost of the war for the enemy
• combat is the only means of war

Chapter 3: On military genius

• military genius consists of a combination of elements that influence military performance
• war being the realm of chance
• the importance of the intellect in war
• the role of the commander
• temperament and feelings's influence in war
• relationship between warfare and terrain

Chapter 4: On danger in war

• the effect that immediate danger has on the mind of a soldier

Chapter 5: On physical effort in war

• physical effort can't be measured
• hardships are no excuse for a defeat, bu they boost the value of a victory

Chapter 6: Intelligence in war

• the unreliable character of information in war
• most intelligence is false, and reports of bad news multiply easily

Chapter 7: Friction in war

• even the simplest thing is difficult in war
• how performance in war is lowered by many factors 
• habit and experience are essential for sound decision-making

Chapter 8: Concluding observations on Book One

• danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction are the elements that impede activity in war. They can be countered by combat experience

Source(s):
On War

Book recommendation - Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity

This book presents the evolution of warfare methods in Greece and Rome. It depicts battles, campaigns and military practices in detail, while also bringing up interesting topics, such as how the emulation of the glorious past influenced the behavior of troops and leaders in both the Greek and Roman civilizations. I summarized the chapters below:

Chapter 1: Fighting in the Iliad

• Homer's epic poem depicts fights between heroes as one-on-one duels
• competition in excellence between the combatants
• slaying a strong opponent brings more glory to the victor
• the Iliad set the foundation for the spirit of competition among the Greeks

Chapter 2: The Last Hoplite - The Origins of the Phalanx

• the story of the 300 vs. 300 battle between Spartans and Argives, at the end of which Othryades, a lone Spartan survivor, remained standing in his place among the hoplite ranks
• emergence of phalanx combat
• cavalry and archer corps gradually give way to the heavy-armored infantry suited to disciplined fighting in a formation
• holding one's place in the ranks is the supreme display of courage in phalanx combat and a way to compete between each other

Chapter 3: Two Stubborn Spartans in the Persian War - City and Discipline in the Phalanx

• the hoplites' acts of courage or cowardice reflect on the reputation of their cities
• Spartans marched and fought in a calm and disciplined way, without being driven by anger or passion
• Spartan obedience to the laws and commanders was a competition of excellence

Chapter 4: The Guile of Delium - Generals and Tactics in the Phalanx

• focus on the first part of the  Peloponnesian war
• in the battle between Athenians and Boeotians, the Thebans used an unprecedented tactic of a 25 deep phalanx. The Athenians were routed, but Socrates rallied them and led them to safety
• normal conventions of warfare are discarded in favor of more cunning methods with a better chance for victory
• examples of Spartan tricks and deception in battle
• the kings and commanders also fought in the phalanx, being part of the hoplite competition of valor
• cunning on the general's part interfered with the hoplite code of bravery that was implied by standing one's ground in battle
• competition between leaders manifested in skills such as troop deployment, persuasion and stratagems

Chapter 5: The Arts of War in the Early Fourth Century BC - Peltasts, Cavalry, and Training

• focus on the last part of the  Peloponnesian war
• changes in warfare are introduced. Sparta reestablishes troops of archers and cavalry
• emergence of light troops and mercenaries
• in the battle of Lechaeum, the Athenian peltasts inflicted heavy damage on the Spartan hoplites, who were unaccustomed to opponents who used hit-and-run tactics
• description of cavalry tactics, formations, and drills
• instilling discipline to unruly troops by making drills a competition, sometimes with an audience
• competition between cities by the way of hoplite fighting gradually gives way to individual competition between soldiers in their area of expertise
• the military maneuvers that led to Sparta's defeat by Thebes at Leuctra 
• description of the Theban Sacred Band made up of 300 male lovers

Chapter 6: Alexander the Great at the Battle of Issus - Homer and Macedonian Warfare

• Alexander's campaigns and tactics 
• Alexander's fixation with Achylles and the competition with his achievements
• story of how Alexander fought in one of his battles wearing an ancient armor that was thought to have been used in the battle of Troy
• description of how Alexander's army was organized
• the practice of ranking and rewarding merit, in order from the first to the eight, and punishment that implied losing one's position in the army and of the status that came with it

Chapter 7: Hellenistic Warfare (323-31 BC) - Competition, Combat and Innovation

• covers the battles over Alexander's empire
• emergence of various military disciplines in which games and contests were held, such as the games of Samos
• the loose discipline of the Hellenistic troops was compensated by their competition in obedience to commands and precision of execution
• the competition in stratagems and army deployment between generals Antigonus and Eumenes
• the importance of training for armies likened to that for professional athletes

Chapter 8: Early Roman Warfare - Single Combat and the Legion of Maniples

• tales of single combat duels between Romans and their foes
• spoils taken from winning duels granted special honors for a Roman warrior
• the organization of a legion of maniples and its combat methods
• the Romans' conception of their past
• 2 dominant aspects of Roman warfare: virtus and disciplina

Chapter 9: The Wrath of Pydna - Command, Discipline and Courage in the Roman Republic

• focus on the war between Rome and Macedonia
• the connection between war and public opinion in Roman society
• the Romans' aggressive behavior in war and disdain for caution
• the superiority of the Macedonian phalanx against the Romans until the defeat at Pydna
• conflict between the notion of virtus and the need for tactics in warfare

Chapter 10: Caesar's Centurions and the Legion of Cohorts - Military Culture and Greek Influence in the Late Republic

• describes Caesar's campaigns
• the aggressive bravery and high casualty rate of Roman centurions
• the organization of a legion and the cohorts' versatility

Chapter 11: Scenes from the Jewish War, AD 67-70: Fighting, Working and Training in the Roman Imperial Army

• chronicles the Jewish War
• increasingly important role of auxiliaries, supported by the scenes on Trajan's Column
• competition in disciplina for the legions and in virtus for the auxiliaries

Chapter 12: Shield Wall and Mask - The Military Past in the Roman Empire

• Roman combat style switching to the shield wall
• testudo - the tortoise formation
• masks that signified the excellence in horsemanship of the wearer, and the influence of the Greek history and mythology
• tendency to revive Greek traditions of fighting

Chapter 13: Julian in Persia, AD 363 - Triumph of the Ghosts

• description of emperor Julian's campaign in Persia
• Julian's emulation of the past in warfare
• the battle of Adrianople

I found this book an excellent read about the methods and transitions of warfare from the heroic times of the Iliad, through to Alexander the Great's conquests, and Rome's evolution from republic to empire. It also includes quotes and interesting, less known facts (or they were for me). Did you know that Alexander carried the Iliad with him on campaign to have a constant source of motivation and inspiration? Or how the last surviving Spartan hoplite of a 300 vs. 300 battle between Spartans and Argives claimed the right to victory, even though from the Argives there remained 2 survivors? I really enjoyed this book and all the information that it provided, in an easily readable way, and I highly recommend it for others who are interested in the subject.

Check it out here:

Two swords in modern kendo

             Fighting with two shinai is seldom seen in kendo nowadays. There has been a period when it was popular, but it remains a minority now, difficult both to wield and to judge properly. First of all, in the Nippon Kendō Kata, there are seven techniques with the tachi, and three with the kodachi, but none for the simultaneous use of the two swords. As two-sword fighting remained a rare phenomenon in kenjutsu, it didn't bloom to spectacular popularity in kendo either. The kata were chosen from the most representative techniques that would illustrate good posture, proper interval and cutting technique, and there was no place for scarcely used two-sword techniques.

            At the beginning of the Shōwa period however,  nitō kendo was popular in the students competitions. At that time, there was a sole focus on victory, by any means, among the students, and the reason many of them took nitō was to secure the win of the match against the opponent, by confusing him and putting him in a difficult spot, because not many competitors knew how to fight against someone wielding two shinai. As a result, the schools and universities began to train their students in nitō, to be able to confront a dual wielding opponent. The fixation on victory by using tactics that were unexpected by the opponent was so strong, that in 1930, nitō was banned in student matches. Since the students were only using two shinai as a means for obtaining victory, and were preoccupied by winning the match only, they were neglecting the mental and spiritual development that accompanies the practice of kendo. The ban was lifted in 1991, per the efforts of the All-Japan Student Kendo Federation, which feared that nitō kendo would become extinct, with so few opportunities to learn and practice it.

            From the rules perspective, nitō kendo experienced a slow and lengthy development. One-handed techniques were not approved in official matches until 1919, but they remained frowned upon and to be generally avoided. The criteria for the length and weight of the two shinai were only established in 1943, and they have been revised to accommodate the women practice of nitō as well. With being subjected to regulations similar to sports disciplines, nitō kendo could now become a viable choice in official competitions as well. However, it remains a minority in today's kendo. The validity of the strikes is difficult to judge, and the strikes with the short shinai are generally not considered valid. Although there is a stipulation about the short shinai in the rules and regulations regarding matches and referees, it is somewhat vague and hard to judge.  Because of this, the majority of nitō practitioners only use the short shinai for defense.

            Difficulties in nitō kendo popularity growth

            The development of nitō kendo to a large scale has been hindered by historical reasons, such as the student ban and the late and difficult to judge  regulations. But even today, there aren't many practitioners, and it's generally regarded as a negative deviation from the traditional chūdan stance. There are many obstacles for someone wanting to use nitō, such as the scarcity of two-sword fighting  instructors, the general negative view on nitō, and the skill requirements of effective usage. Because nitō uses the long shinai in a jōdan stance and the short one in a chūdan stance, it is necessary to develop physical muscles that would allow one to efficiently wield the weapons in each arm. Being also a more complex way of fighting, it isn't suitable for beginners, but more to practitioners that have already spent some years training in chūdan. Going straight to nitō is heavily frowned upon. Nishikubo Hiromichi, an influential kendo practitioner and politician of the  Shōwa era, took a more radical view and considered all one-handed techniques should be banned. He argued that using one-handed techniques impede the accumulation of the spirit and that one should not begin training with wielding a sword in one hand, but progress through training normally, until reaching a level where one-handed techniques can be used properly. He also criticized the motion of only swinging the sword without following up with the body, and compared it to a general that orders his soldiers ahead, but remains behind. Even though nitō is also a product, albeit a smaller one, of traditional swordsmanship, the fact that it's being considered more as a negative deviation from the ittō chūdan stance than as an individual style can be attributed to the reputation it had among the students at the beginning of the Shōwa era, and to the fact that it may encourage bad habits for practitioners that aren't sufficiently skilled in ittō chūdan beforehand.

Source(s): Musashi Kai

Miyamoto Musashi's two-sword style

Inspiration for using two swords

There are many theories about how Musashi came to use two swords in his style. His father, Munisai, was a master of various martial arts, including the use of jitte. It is believed that he taught Musashi various combat styles, so Musashi's first impressions on the martial arts as a boy must have come from his father's teachings. One way to use the jitte in combat was to pair it with a long sword, and use it to parry the enemy's attack, then strike him with the sword. This theory is endorsed by a story found in the Tanji hokin hikki manuscript, that describes how Musashi left his home after an argument with his father. He criticized his father's jitte technique, and Munisai, in anger, threw a dagger, then his short sword at him, upon which Musashi dodged both weapons and fled the house. This story can also serve as a basis for one theory which holds that throwing the short sword like a shuriken was one of the techniques that Musashi taught later in his Niten Ichi-ryū style.

Another possible inspiration is believed to be the drumstick movement of taiko. As a child, Musashi had the chance to observe the rhythmic movement of the two drumsticks at the Aramaki, or Sanomo shrine, a shinto shrine in the Miyamoto village.

Without ignoring how these experiences must have influenced Musashi in using two swords, I consider his combat experience as the primary factor for his choice of dual wielding weapons. The historical records of many of his duels, including his most famous one, against Sasaki Kojirō, describe him using a single sword. But in The Ground Book section of his treatise, Musashi advocates the use of the long and short sword for fighting against a large number of enemies:

                        It is better to use two swords rather than one when you are fighting a crowd,                                        and especially if you want to take a prisoner.

He also explains about the best use of the short sword, according to the environment:

                      The best use of the companion sword is in a confined space, or when you are                                         engaged closely with an opponent.

These statements hint at the fact that the effective use of the two swords has been tested through his own experience from his many duels. He found the use of two swords beneficial in various circumstances, as dictated by the environment or number of opponents.

Duels where Musashi fought with two swords

Although few, there are descriptions about some of Musashi's duels where he used two swords. One such duel was against Shishido, a master of the kusarigama. During the fight, Shishido arrested Musashi's sword with the chain, but then Musashi threw his wakizashi and killed him. From this story it can be surmised that Musashi was indeed adept at throwing weapons.

Another duel was the one against Miyake Gunbei, when Musashi used two wooden swords, one long and one short. He restrained Gunbei's sword by combining his two swords into a gassho position,  and kept him in check, before eventually winning by parrying one of his blows with the short sword in his left hand and stabbing Gunbei on the cheek with the sword in his right hand.

This way of fighting by using the two swords like a scissors against the opponent's sword was also mentioned in the description of a match held at Tokugawa Yoshinao's request, when Musashi demonstrated his style by fighting against a swordsman from the Owari clan, and nullified all his attacks with his two swords, while leading him in circles around the dojo and not initiating any offensive action himself.

And yet another use of two swords in a match was against lord Matsudaira Izumo no kami Naomasa, who wanted to test how effective Musashi's style really is, and also had to admit defeat against him.

Two swords in the Yagyū Shinkage-ryū techniques

It is interesting to observe the fact that in the Illustrated Catalog of the Shinkage-ryū Martial Arts, there are some techniques that deal with opponents wielding two swords: the korandome (opponent has a short sword in his left hand a long sword in his right hand), and the subete koran uchimonodome (opponent holds a long sword in his left hand and a short one in his right hand).

 So, even though Musashi was the most famous practitioner and founder of a two sword style, another kenjutsu school also recognized the need to know how to fight against an enemy that is wielding two swords.

Source(s):
The Lone Samurai: The Life of Miyamoto Musashi
The Book of Five Rings
The Life-Giving Sword: Secret Teachings from the House of the Shogun

4 types of commanders who ruin themselves - Kōyō Gunkan

The Kōyō Gunkan is a military treatise of the Takeda clan, one of the prominent clans of medieval Japan, best known for the military exploits of the prodigious general Takeda Shingen. This book was completed by Obata Kagenori, a vassal of the Takeda clan, and it records in detail historical battles of the Takeda, military strategy, army organization, and other aspects pertaining to the bushido and the proper comportment of a samurai. Inside there is a section about the 4 types of commanders that bring ruin to their country and clan, which I summarized below:

The foolish commander. This is the selfish ruler who day in and day out indulges in pleasures and festivities, like trips, moon-viewing parties, hanami, and any other eccentricities that catch his fancy. He devotes himself solely to entertainment, and even though he may take up martial arts on a whim, he can't seriously practice them because his heart always drifts to one thing or another. Many flatterers gather around such a lord, while those willing to remonstrate with him grow fewer. If he were wise, he would know his abilities and recognize flattery when praised for something he isn't good at, but he gets carried away by compliments and is oblivious to right and wrong. This type of commander attracts many sycophants, while good men leave from his employ. The retainers who advance in position thanks to flattery speak ill of good retainers and spread lies to boast of their achievements, even though they haven't achieved anything by 30 or 40. The most representative example given for such a general is the son of Imagawa Yoshimoto, Ujizane. Instead of heeding the council that had served his family for successive generations, he only listened to and relied on a man named Miura Uemon and his connections, bringing the wrath of the Mikawa samurai upon his family.

The too clever general. He is prone to fits of pride or depression. Such a lord is thrifty with paying his retainers, who have to resort to taxing the peasants for their livelihood. Being confident in his cleverness, he doesn't listen to advice, or when hearing the opinions of someone knowledgeable about things, he nods approvingly, pretending to understand. If victorious in battle, he takes all the credit, ignoring the contribution of others. If there are capable men among his chief retainers, he looks at them with suspicion. A good general would acknowledge the achievements of his men and would praise them accordingly, and by doing so his men would grow braver and more loyal. The example given for this type of general is Takeda Shingen's heir, Yoshinobu. At the battle of Kawanakajima, he openly criticized his father's strategy, eventually rebelling against him, and being forced to commit seppuku.

The cowardly general. Such a lord is suspicious towards his retainers, promoting those who flatter him and treating coldly those who would remonstrate with him. He doesn't know the ability of his men, and because he is oblivious to duty, his men seek better employment. He flees from battle and is envious of others, trying to thwart them from success. The example given is of Uesugi Sadamasa of the Oogigayatsu family, who grew suspicious of his retainer Oota Doukan, who proved capable in his assignments. Sadamasa had Doukan assassinated, and because of this, he lost many retainers and became enemies with Uesugi Akisada of the Yamanouchi family. He died when he fell from his horse when crossing a river to attack Akisada.

The overly strong commander. He is confident, quick-witted, eloquent in speech and wise. Because he despises weakness in everything, including words, his retainers can't properly communicate with him, and he takes a liking to those who speak only bold and strong words. Such a lord wants to appear stronger than his predecessors, so he acts in a high and mighty manner. His men fight to the death over any minor trouble, while those who hold their lives dear feign illness so that they can be exempted from military service. Shingen's son, Takeda Katsuyori is given as example. Being the son of such an accomplished general, he wanted to surpass his father. In search of a glorious victory that would propel him forward from his father's shadow, he fought recklessly and was defeated, bringing destruction to his clan.

Takeda Katsuyori

Source(s): 武士道の名著 - 日本人の精神史